GLOBAL TERROR The making of a jihadist group

GLOBAL TERROR

The making of a jihadist group

To expand its geopolitical interest Pakistan’s most dangerous outfit is the Lashkar, points out a writer Stanly Johny.

The world woke up to the dangers posed by the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) only after 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai that kill more than 160 people, including foreigners. Though the group was recognised as foreign terrorist organisation by the U.S. Government in December 2001, the U.S. saw that it largely as India’s problem. The Mumbai attack changed that approach. There was a pile up of literature of LeT, and U.S. started putting more pressure on Pakistan to take action against the group. But despite the efforts, the LeT’s operation were largely unaffected. C. Christine Fair explains in her book, In Their Own World: Understanding Laskar-e-Tayyaba, why and how the group survived the global anti-terror campaign.

Pakistan’s designs

Fair, an associate professor at Georgetown University, U.S., tells the story of the LeT by analysing the group’s own literature. She places the rise of the jihadist group’s own literature. She places the rise of the jihadist group in the largest context of Pakistan’s power complex and its ‘revisionist’ character. Pakistan has not satisfied with the outcome of partition. So it has always wanted to change that geography of subcontinent. Since it lacked the conventional might to do so – all attempts to change the status quo through conventional conflict were thwarted by India – it turned to sub-continental methods. Over the years, Pakistan has used several proxies to expand its geopolitical interests abroad. Of them, the LeT is ‘the most lethal and most loyal’ outfit of the Pakistan establishment, argues Fair.

               Why so? There’s an ideological convergence between the LeT and the Pakistan establishment. The Pakistani army doesn’t want to proxies to challenge its interests within the country. For the LeT, ‘jihad’ is the battle it fights beyond Pakistan’s borders(say, India and Afghanistan). Even when other proxy group turned against the Pakistani military in the wake of its joining hands with the U.S.’s war terror I the early 2000s, the LeT has never launched

 attacks within Pakistan. Inside the country, the LeT stayed focussed

 on its social and philanthropic activities, while India and Afghanistan,

 it carried out subverting activities. The suits the establishment, which 

in return offered protection to the leT.

HYDRA-HEADED OUTFIT

Fair gives a detailed of the LeT’s ideological roots, organizational structure and its evolution as a hydra-headed social and militant outfit. When the group come under international pressure, it would rename it-self as a social organisation and emerge unaffected by state actions. Fair says that there were occasions where intelligence warned the group about impending government actions so that the LeT or its parent organisation Jamaatud - Dawa could take counter masures in advance. JuD or LeT now have countless family organizations, a wide network of activists, large fund-raising capabilities and thousands of recruitment centres. It remains a threat, primarily to India.

               So what can be done? Fair lays down three options maintain the status quo, decapitate the leadership, or escalate tensions problem is that Pakistan’s nuclear capability offers the country some protection for its proxy activists. Both India and other affected countries should bear that in mind while formulated polices.